This post discusses Edith Stein’s 1916 work ‘On The Problem of Empathy’.

I have talked quite a lot about phenomenology on this blog and more recently I discussed the problem of understanding object’s experiences. ‘On the Problem of Empathy ‘ is an earlier attempt than Bogost’s (2012) go to address a similar problem, how can we understand what its like to be another person or thing? Unlike Bogost, I feel Stein’s attempt is more traditional phenomenological in the Husserlian mode, after all the book is actually Stein’s doctoral thesis from 1916 under Husserl. Thus one finds the suspension of the natural attitude and the role of imagination playing a role- Husserl was clearly a strong influence.

My interest in this work mainly derives from a philosophical, but also sociological perspective. Phenomenology is often described as a proto-constructivist philosophy, yet to me based on my reading this is not the case. Husserl (2013) for example discusses the idea of intentionality- which suggests consciousness is always directed at something, often real objects. Merleau-Ponty (2004) often describes the body as mediator- it gives access to the world because it is embedded in it physically. Yet, as those who have read Husserl will know the role of consciousness does indeed play a pivotal role. It is just not the only factor. My point here is that phenomenology offers a philosophical position that is neither realist or constructivist and therefore offers an interesting metaphysical alternative. Edith Stein, as I will come to, discusses in some detail, the role of the real world (but there is no indication it is seen as secondary). On the other hand, the sociological aspect of my interest emerges from the problem of empathy, particularly highlighting our relationships with others, whether they are subjects or objects (if those distinctions are still relevant).

Firstly and philosophically, it is important to highlight that Stein does not ignore the epoche (suspension of the belief in the natural world) nor does she deny the role consciousness can play in forming phenomena presented to us. However, she does highlight the role of the body, as a physical entity and how sensation is important. Notably, she distinguishes between the sensed living body and the outwardly perceived body of the outer (physical) world. This should not be seen as a denial of the sensed living body not being materially real; the body and consciousness, the real and constructed both form our experience of phenomena. However, a distinction is made between the body as a way of generating experience and the body as is perceived. Yet, the physical body does exist, no matter how the psychical plays a role in forming our experience of it. Stein also notes how the body remains relatively constant no matter how things around us change, it could be said the body is an essence.

The partial physicality of the body and the world is also emphasised through Stein’s comment ‘every step I take discloses a new bit of the world to me or I see the old from a new side’ (p47). This, of course, suggests there is a world to be discovered and that it can be experienced in different ways. However, the physical world cannot be the only factor that constitutes reality- consciousness still plays a role. Consider the role of imagination and fantasy- one can think of a different arrangement of objects in comparison to the one that is presented in the senses. One could see a table with a glass top, but one could rearrange it to be wooden in one’s mind. There is no reason to suggest that intentionality of an imaginary object is fundamentally different from that of a physical object. De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007), who are two enactivists, see the living and cognitive systems as part of a multidimensional continuum. To them, the world is subjective to the extent that an agent places their own perspective on it, but exchanges with the world still impact the agent. This idea of a ‘continuum’ might help us understand Stein, the imaginary and physical could be seen as different parts of a continuum. A fantasy is more (though not completely subjective), whereas the physical encounter with the object is more materially located.

I now want to move on to the act of empathy and particularly whether we can experience what it’s like to be a different subject or object. Stein defines empathy as ‘the experience of foreign consciousness’ (p11). This is an interesting statement to analyse. What essentially is empathy? On one hand, it could be seen as feeling something similar to a foreign consciousness, more radically it could be described as experiencing what it is like to be another consciousness. More problematically, what actually is a foreign consciousness? Does it have to be human? The answer is no, according to Stein, who argues we can empathise with plants and animals, but she does not mention whether it is possible to empathise with physical objects (like a rock or a pencil). Despite, these questions, I would take Stein’s argument to be that empathy is understanding the phenomenology of another consciousness,. By this I mean the way another individual interacts with the world and how their consciousness affects it. I will now elaborate on this.

Stein suggests we can think what it would be like to have another body because we know how to experience our own body. Thus, we gain access to the sensation of a body through our direct possession of one. Yet, consciousness also plays a role in facilitating how we understand how another body is because we can imagine what another body is like. Another example is a dog wagging its tail- we know that it is happy, so we can empathise with the experience it is having of joy. We know what the sensation of joy is like, thus we can imagine what it might be like for a different consciousness. This dog example raises an interesting question in relation to empathy, is there a common pool of experience or common language for experiences. If so, does this explain why we know what it is like for a dog to have joy? This is an interesting question whether it is seen through a metaphorical or realist sense in terms of a pool’s existence. Either way, Stein does not really address it in this work, despite its potential relevance.

There is one more thing I want to say about the empathetic process- it is, according to Stein, possible to gain an understanding of how another thinks through their repeated habits. An angry outburst reflects a poor temperament, if this is repeated then one can gain insight into what it is like to think like the angry person. This raises the ‘pool’ question and whether person A’s anger is the same as person B’s anger. I would like to believe that one can empathise with another individual, but whether this is to a partial degree or not is another question. I am firm believer in the idea that we often underestimate our capability to experience other consciousnesses- we cannot rule out the possibility because it is inconvenient.

Overall, then Stein’s work poses interesting questions and it certainly is a well-reasoned approach to understanding whether empathy is possible with other consciousnesses and whether the world is ‘constructed’ or ‘real’. I cannot help think though there are questions that need addressing further, what is empathy and how do we gain an empathy with another consciousness (i.e. is there a common ‘pool’ or vocabulary)?

Bibliography

Bogost, I. Alien phenomenology, or, what it’s like to be a thing. U of Minnesota Press, 2012.

De Jaegher, H. and Di Paolo, E., 2007. Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition. Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, 6, pp.485-507.

Husserl, E. Cartesian meditations: An introduction to phenomenology. Springer Science & Business Media, 2013.

Merleau-Ponty, M. The World of Perception. Routledge, 2004.

Stein, E. 1989. On the problem of empathy Third Revised Edition. ICS Publications.