This post contains an undergraduate essay which aimed to apply the ideas of William Reddy and Jacques Derrida to the history of emotions. It was in answer to the question; ‘Do emotions get lost or found over time or does the vocabulary to describe them merely change?‘.

Emotions cannot be lost or found over time, as they are never fully present in the first place. Likewise, while the vocabulary used to describe emotions may change this does not mean we can use words to meaningfully talk about them. This essay will use ideas from linguistics and continental philosophy to critique traditional approaches to the history of emotions. It will suggest the debate posed by the question is fundamentally flawed, as it relies on the assumption that emotions or the words used to describe them can be fully present. I will demonstrate this in two sections; the first will explain why the ideas of Jacques Derrida and William Reddy are relevant to tackling this question. The second section builds on this by using several case studies to show that many of the problems encountered in this debate are explained by these ideas. By doing this, it will become clear that any generalisations that can be made in this comparative discussion can be attributed to the historiographical, philosophical and scientific assumptions of scholars researching emotions.

The ideas of Jacques Derrida, a twentieth-century continental philosopher, are relevant to discussing whether emotions are lost or found or if emotional vocabularies merely change. This is seen by the ambiguity Derrida applies to words. Ferdinand de Saussure suggested that words only receive their meaning through their relations with others.[1] Derrida developed this through the idea of différance, which suggests because of this interdependence, words can never fully summon their meaning. It is always deferred due to the mixture of presence and absence created by these relationships.[2] The implications of this are shown through Derrida’s analysis of the word pharmakon found in Plato’s Phaedrus; which he describes as ambivalent, standing for both remedy and poison simultaneously.[3] Therefore, as a result of différance, a word never fully summons a single meaning.  How is this relevant? One only needs to look at the bibliography to see that previous histories of emotions have focused on single words; like nostalgia, sympathy or acedia. The ideas of Derrida would suggest this is wrong, emotional words cannot be understood in isolation. If one was to study a word to see if the vocabulary of emotions merely changes or an emotion is lost or found, they would be operating on the incorrect assumption words can accurately represent a given emotion at any time.

Having established that these ideas are relevant to discussing the vocabulary of emotions, how can we link them to experience rather than language? Reddy’s idea of emotives allows us to do this. Emotives are utterances which alter the state of an emotion itself, due to the effects vocalisation can have, like reaffirming or denying a particular state.[4] It may initially appear odd to use ideas from an article titled ‘Against Constructionism’ in conjunction with a postructuralist thinker like Derrida. However, Reddy clearly had some of his ideas in mind while discussing emotions. ‘Emotions are the real-world-anchor of signngs.’[5] For Reddy, emotives automatically confirm the existence of something outside of language through failing at representation. Therefore, they act like a bridge between reality and language.[6] Consequently, while discussing whether emotions are lost and found or the vocabulary to describe them merely changes, we need to recognise that the experience of an emotion and its language are interlinked.

I will now demonstrate the relevance of this to our discussion. If the experience of an emotion and the language used to describe it do not have rigid boundaries, we can also imply they might share similar qualities. In fact, a large portion of Derrida’s Of Grammatology was dedicated to undermining binaries like these. Like those of the eighteenth-century philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rosseau, such as speech/writing and nature/society.[7] Therefore, if the idea of différance makes it difficult to talk about emotional vocabularies, this would equally apply to the experience of an emotion itself. Derrida also suggested that the history of western metaphysics has been dominated by the idea of presence.^[8] However, différance, as discussed, undermined this. The implications are clear. Most theories of emotions take it for-granted that emotions can be isolated and studied separate from their counterparts. This is most obvious in the ‘Hydraulic model’ which views emotions as bubbling below the surface, ready to be switched on or off.[9] However, based on Derrida’s ideas it is implausible to take this view which would prioritise an emotion’s presence. it is wrong to discuss whether emotions are lost or found over time or whether the vocabulary used to describe them merely changes, as doing so implies an emotion or word is ever fully present.  

Having problematised our ability to talk about whether emotions are lost and found or the vocabulary to describe them merely changes, I will now show how most issues encountered in this debate are attributable to presumptions that emotions or emotional words are ever fully present.  I will firstly do this by looking at those who suggest the words to describe emotions merely change or that there is an element of universality to emotions.

The first case study I will use to critique those suggesting words to describe emotions merely change, will focus on acedia. This word has proved problematic for historians trying to match its meaning with ‘modern’ emotions. Originating from the monastic movement of early Christianity, in particular through the writings of Evagrius (345-399) and John Cassian (360-435) scholars have connected it to a range of states like depression and Emile Durkheim’s concept of anomie.[10] The latter describing the disjuncture between a society’s expectations and an individual’s ability to reach them.[11] This discussion over what acedia can be ‘matched up to’ is a result of its symptomatic variety. For example, acedia was both seen as a dedication to prayer and extreme asceticism.[12] However, all the attempts at understanding acedia have a major similarity; they presume there is a single, definable concept that can be translated into the language of modernity. A manifestation of assigning importance to presence. A simpler explanation for acedia’s symptoms is that the emotion was never fully present in the first place. Like language, an emotion is slippery and can only be understood through its relationship with other emotions. It is never present by itself. This is shown by how John Cassian’s concept of Acedia borrows from the concept of sloth, whereas for him Tristia is also more equivalent to Evagrius’ notion of Acedia.[13]  Therefore, it is wrong to speak of the words describing acedia merely changing because doing so presumes we can identify single emotions in the past.

In comparison to this, the idea of presence has also been used in science to suggest the vocabulary to describe emotions merely changes. Several scholars have deferred to biology as a universal constant when studying emotions. Frevert describes how brain damage can impair a person’s sympathy, whereas Hunt writes autism also does this.[14] However, this recourse to science contradicts with these scholars’ semi-constructionism. For example, Frevert writes ‘honour can confuse those looking for a biological’ explanation to emotions, a claim at odds with her earlier statement.[15] This implies there is a problem using science to suggest words for emotions merely change.

The idea of presence can explain this contradiction found arguing for a degree of universality in emotions. Scholars presume medical terminology can accurately represent the condition it refers to. O’Sullivan’s study challenges this by looking at transformations in the diagnosis of nostalgia as a medical condition during nineteenth-century France.[16] There was not a single identifiable condition known as nostalgia, as a term can never fully describe an illness. This is reemphasised by nostalgia still having divergent meanings into the twentieth century.[17] Therefore, scholars using science to suggest words describing emotions merely change end up contradicting themselves, as the meaning of a condition is never fully present. Consequently, it is impossible to reduce emotions purely to a biological state. The use of science can therefore be compared to studies on the word acedia, as they both rely on the incorrect assumptions that emotions can ever be fully present. The similarities between them are not historic but based on philosophical presumptions of scholars.

I will now demonstrate this is equally true when describing emotions as having a largely cultural basis or as being lost or found over time. Fiering describes various approaches to sympathy in the eighteenth-century, during which both theological and humanitarian approaches to the emotion interacted with each other.^[18] However, constructivist approaches like this struggle to identify precise points for emotional transformations. Instead, they focus on longer time periods like a century. This problem is explained by the fact there is a not a single transition point for emotions, as due to their interdependence on each other they are never fully present. Sympathy in the eighteenth-century can only be understood through its religious, classical and humanitarian contexts and not by itself.[19] As a result, it is inaccurate to state that emotions are lost and found because they are never fully present in the first place.

The problem of metaphysical assumptions regarding presence can also be extended to the sources consulted when discussing whether emotions are lost or found. Halsall has described how the portrayal of King Guntram and Chilperic in Gregory of Tours’ sixth-century Ten Books of Histories often changed due to political circumstances.[20] Guntram’s inconsistent emotions, like piety and anger, could therefore be described as becoming lost or found in the sources due to the political conditions the author lived in. However, the emotional inconsistencies could also be attributed to that the fact that emotions are never fully present; Guntram’s anger can only be understood through its interaction with his piety. His frequently contradictory actions and emotions are explained by the fact that he is never fully in one state or another. In this way, talking about whether emotions are lost or found is problematised by ideas of presence.

This essay has suggested it is difficult to talk about whether emotions are lost and found or whether the vocabulary to describe them merely changes, as doing so operates on metaphysical assumptions regarding presence. It then explained how many of the problems encountered while studying emotions are a consequence of this. Simultaneously, it showed many comparisons made while studying emotions originate from historiographical presumptions, rather than the past itself. My argument may appear overly cynical regarding the information we can ascertain through the history of emotions. This was not intended. Future studies could focus on how different emotions and emotional words interact, which would increase our understanding of their multifaceted nature. Nevertheless, it is clear emotions are not lost or found over time and the words to describe them do not merely change.

Bibliography

Crislip, Andrew. “The Sin of Sloth or the Illness of the Demons? The Demon of Acedia in Early Christian Monasticism.” The Harvard Theological Review 98, no. 2 (2005): 143-69.

de Saussure, Ferdinand. Course in General Linguistics. Translated by Wade Baskin.  New York City: McGraw-Hill Paperbacks, 1966.

Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.  Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press 1977.

Derrida, Jacques. “Plato’s Pharmacy”. Originally published 1981. Accessed 19/02/2019 at http://www.occt.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/derrida_platos_pharmacy.pdf

Fiering, Norman S. “Irresistible Compassion: An Aspect of Eighteenth-Century Sympathy and Humanitarianism.” Journal of the History of Ideas 37, no. 2 (1976): 195-218.

Frevert, Ute. Emotions in History-Lost and Found.  Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011.

Halsall, Guy. “Nero and Herod? The death of Chilperic and Gregory of Tours’ writing of history.” In The World of Gregory of Tours, edited by Kathleen Mitchell and Ian Wood, 337-50. Leiden: Brill, 2002.

Hunt, Lynne. Inventing Human Rights: A History.  New York City: W. W. Norton, 2008.

Matt, Susan J. “You Can’t Go Home Again: Homesickness and Nostalgia in U.S. History.” Journal of American History 94, no. 2 (2007): 469-97.

O’Sullivan, Lisa. “The Time and Place of Nostalgia: Re-situating a French Disease.” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 67, no. 4 (2011): 626-49.

Reddy, William. “Against Constructionism: The Historical Ethnography of Emotions.” Current Anthropology 38, no. 3 (1997): 327-51.

Reddy, William, xa, and M. “Against Constructionism: The Historical Ethnography of Emotions.” Current Anthropology 38, no. 3 (1997): 327-51.

Rosenwein, Barbara H. “Worrying about Emotions in History.” The American Historical Review 107, no. 3 (2002): 821-45.

Toohey, Peter. “Acedia in Late Classical Antiquity.” Illinois Classical Studies 15, no. 2 (1990): 339-52.

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[1] Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New York City: McGraw-Hill Paperbacks, 1966), 114-16.

[2] Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press 1977), 57-60.

[3] Jacques Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy”. Originally published 1981. Accessed 19/02/2019 at http://www.occt.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/derrida_platos_pharmacy.pdf

[4] William Reddy, “Against Constructionism: The Historical Ethnography of Emotions,” Current Anthropology 38, no. 3 (1997).

[5] Reddy, “Against Constructionism: The Historical Ethnography of Emotions,” 332.

[6] Reddy, “Against Constructionism: The Historical Ethnography of Emotions,” 332.

[7] Derrida, Of Grammatology.

[8] Derrida, Of Grammatology, 10-12.

[9] Barbara H. Rosenwein, “Worrying about Emotions in History,” The American Historical Review 107, no. 3 (2002): 834.

[10] Peter Toohey, “Acedia in Late Classical Antiquity,” Illinois Classical Studies 15, no. 2 (1990): 340; Andrew Crislip, “The Sin of Sloth or the Illness of the Demons? The Demon of Acedia in Early Christian Monasticism,” The Harvard Theological Review 98, no. 2 (2005): 159-66.

[11] Crislip, “The Sin of Sloth or the Illness of the Demons? The Demon of Acedia in Early Christian Monasticism,” 159.

[12]Crislip, “The Sin of Sloth or the Illness of the Demons? The Demon of Acedia in Early Christian Monasticism,” 150-53.

[13]Toohey, “Acedia in Late Classical Antiquity,” 342.

[14] Lynne Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York City: W. W. Norton, 2008), 39; Ute Frevert, Emotions in History-Lost and Found (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011), 20.

[15] Frevert, Emotions in History-Lost and Found, 52-53.

[16] Lisa O’Sullivan, “The Time and Place of Nostalgia: Re-situating a French Disease,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 67, no. 4 (2011).

[17] Susan J. Matt, “You Can’t Go Home Again: Homesickness and Nostalgia in U.S. History,” Journal of American History 94, no. 2 (2007): 470.

[18] Norman S. Fiering, “Irresistible Compassion: An Aspect of Eighteenth-Century Sympathy and Humanitarianism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 37, no. 2 (1976): 215.

[19] Fiering, “Irresistible Compassion: An Aspect of Eighteenth-Century Sympathy and Humanitarianism,” 196-98.

[20] Guy Halsall, “Nero and Herod? The death of Chilperic and Gregory of Tours’ writing of history,” in The World of Gregory of Tours, ed. Kathleen Mitchell and Ian Wood (Leiden: Brill, 2002).