The Late Antique Podcast #1: Introduction and The Historicity of Jordanes’ Getica

June 26, 2020February 9, 2022 ~ Liam Greenacre ~ Leave a comment

I have just started a podcast and have uploaded it to Podbean. As part of this endeavour, I shall also share my podcasts here, so I can provide a complete script and bibliography which I cannot on some other sites.

Script:

Introduction

Hello there, my name is Liam and this is The Early Medieval Podcast. Today, I’m going to be talking about Jordanes Getica or Gothic History, but as this is the first episode I want to start off with an introduction to myself and the podcast. So let’s begin. I am currently a Masters student in Medieval Studies at the University of York and my interests include philosophy (medieval, modern and postmodern), network analysis and sixth-century Italy. I also run a blog called ‘Philosophical Ostrogoth’ where I post my thoughts on these topics, especially and unsurprisingly, because of its name, the main focus is on philosophy.

Why have I chosen to start a podcast? Well firstly I want to share my passion for Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages with the public. Secondly, I feel there is a gap in the podcast market for the Early Middle Ages. Finally, because I just want to try something new and exciting as a hobby.

Now another thing I want to mention is that I am a complete amateur at podcasting. I don’t have an expensive microphone and so expect hitches. Writing scripts for the public is also new for me, therefore I will likely change my style as I go on. First and foremost the podcast is meant to be fun, for me and the listeners. I will also not keep to a strict schedule at first, but if I gain enough followers I might. Furthermore, the podcasts may be short at first, but I expect them to still be informative about the subject I am discussing.

Before I start, I also want to highlight that I am working with limited resources and texts at the minute. Due to coronavirus, I can’t access physical books from my university library, so I will be working with what I can get.

With that short introduction other, let’s begin talking about the Getica. The central debate that I shall be focusing on today is whether Jordanes’ work can be used to accurately talk about early Gothic history. In particular, I will talk about whether it contains genuine Gothic folk memories or whether it is a literary work far removed from that context.

Who was Jordanes? He was a Goth, but he was also thoroughly Roman. He grew up as part of a Gothic people who had been settled in the Eastern Roman Empire for a long time. Furthermore, as informs us himself, he was a convert into Catholicism, he was not an Arian like the Ostrogoths. The Getica or Gothic History was written in Constantinople, so he wrote under conditions that may have made him biased towards the Eastern Roman Empire. The Getica was complete sometime after March 551.

One important point, which we will return to throughout this episode, is that the Getica was supposedly an abridgement of an earlier work by the Roman statesmen Cassiodorus, who served at the Ostrogothic court in Italy. Jordanes writes ‘you urge me to leave the little work I have in hand, that is the abbreviation of the Chronicles, and to condense in my own style in this small book the twelve volumes of the Senator on the origin and deeds of the Getae from olden time the present day’. Keeping in mind this fact will serves well to remind us the complex nature of the Getica.

I will now give an overview of the history, so you have a general sense of the structure of the text. The History starts off with a geographic section, which introdunces Scandza or Scandinavia as the supposed original home of the Goths. It then describes the entry of the Goths into Scythia and their activities in the areas surrounding there- Scythia in this instance is the Eastern Balkans and Asia Minor. The narrative then goes on discuss how the Goths were now split into the Ostrogoths and Visigoths, though at the same they are still effectively one people. It, at this point, describes their interactions with the Roman Empire. That is until the Huns arrive and force the Ostrogoths and Visigoths to move apart. Following on from this the two peoples have fairly distinct histories and the Getica follows these. Firstly, by looking at the Visigoths and then by examining the history of the Ostrogoths. The Getica’s narrative terminates with the conquest of Ostrogothic Italy by the Eastern Roman Emperor Justinian.

Is the Getica accurate?

Hopefully, you now have a general sense of what the Getica says and the narrative it tells. However, is it accurate or is it a mere literary project with specific aims in mind? Most scholars don’t fall into two easy camps about the work. Liebeschuetz, for example, argues the Goths, like mentioned in the Getica, were already a people or gens before entering the Roman Empire. He comments on the fact that as an illiterate society they likely transmitted their histories orally. Therefore, the Getica might contain ‘folk memories’ which were passed down from Goth to Goth. Liebeschuetz writes ‘it is therefore practically certain that stories about the migration were passed from generation to generation in heroic song; and as these stories have no links with any events in Greco-Roman history, they are extremely unlikely to have been derived from any Greco-Roman source. Moreover, because the kings reported to have led the migration are assigned to neither the Amals nor the Balthi, they are not likely to have been invented to glorify the families of either Alaric or Theoderic.’ However, Liebeschuetz also points out that these stories about the Gothic migrations were likely distorted over time. Therefore, accordingly, the Getica likely contains memories with partial truths. The story about their migration may be accurate to a certain extent.

Now, as mentioned, the evidence for Liebeschuetz’s point comes from when the Getica mentions Gothic songs about great ancestors. When describing their entry into Scythia and their defeat of the Spali, Jordanes writes that ‘the story is generally told in their early songs, in almost historic fashion.’ Therefore, we know from this that the Goths had traditions which they passed down through songs. However, were they accurate? Note how Jordanes writes ‘in almost historic fashion’. It seems even Jordanes had doubts about the veracity of these traditions. Straight after this he also mentions the Gothic History of Ablabius, whom he consulted while writing the Getica¸ which he contrastingly calls a ‘most trustworthy account’. It seems to be me, and I don’t think this point has been made before to my knowledge, that Jordanes himself seems to have doubts about the oral histories of the early Gothic migrations. This point is reinforced later when Jordanes makes reference to stories about the Goths being subjected to slavery in Britain, which he calls ‘old wives tales’, while also stating ‘I prefer to believe what I have read’. On this basis then we can doubt certain parts of the Gothic migration story told in the Getica.

I will now mention some other scholarly approaches to the Getica. Herwig Wolfram, like Liebeschuetz, takes a moderate approach to the accuracy of the early parts of the Getica. He criticises Walter Goffart, whom we shall come to, for taking an overly literary approach to Early Medieval source in The Narrators of Barbarian History. Nevertheless, he also suggests the Amal pedigree in the Getica – the Amals being the Ostrogothic ruling family- was likely forged by Cassiodorus. There are also two defenders who believe in the historicity of the Gothic migration stories- Walter Pohl and Richard Wenskus. They offer quite subtle arguments, even if I don’t necessarily agree with them. Wenskus argues that there was no reason for Jordnaes to invent a Scandinavian origin, he writes ‘it was considerably more obvious for a historian of this age to devise a connection to the famous peoples of antiquity, as many examples show.’ And then he states ‘Jordanes’s claim is wholly atypical for his time and therefore proceeds with a high degree of certainty from traditions that have a high degree of probability.’ To summarise, the Scandinavian origin of the Goths is not fictional, because there was no obivious reason to chose it as a literary trope.

Walter Pohl offers another defence of the treasured Scandinavian origin. He suggests that the Scandinavian origin story does not fit in and subverts ‘the orderly narrative based on the written sources’. The story of the Goths- the Scythian, Getic and Dacian past- meanwhile are fictional because they employ other works in a literary style. Therefore, the Scandinavian origin can be true, while other parts of the narrative are false. Nevertheless, I do not think these arguments overturn the previous points about Jordanes’ own doubt about the oral history of the Goths. And so now I turn to Walter Goffart and his more literary approach to the Getica, which shall reinforce my argument.

Walter Goffart and Jordanes

First, a disclaimer, although I think Goffart’s arguments are the most persuasive out of the texts I read while preparing for this podcast. I do not wholly agree with him. In fact, I am not actually sure how much I subscribe to his views. For example, his ideas about Jordanes’ ‘plot’ for the Getica has some problems. Nevertheless, I think the biggest thing one can take from Goffart is his understanding of how complex the Getica is as a text- with its borrowings from other sources and its relation (or lackt thereof) to Cassiodorus’ work. I will now proceed and give an introduction to Goffart’s ideas.

A key point raised by Goffart is that the Getica deserves to be studied in his own right, it should not be simply seen as a mere abridgement of Cassiodorus’ earlier work. For example, Jordanes cites other sources like Ablabius and geographers like Ptolemaeus . For me, Goffart’s focus on the uniqueness of the Getica allows us to approach the work, fairly and on its terms, which I think is pivotal.

However, Goffart’s main argument is that the Getica is a literary text with specific aims in mind- its was not intended to provide a completely accurate history. What was its purpose? Well, for Goffart, it was to integrate the Goths into Justinian’s Eastern Roman Empire. According to Goffart the Getica ‘centres on the love between two peoples, Romans and Goths’. Justinian had recently conquered Italy, so there was a need to integrate the Goths into the Eastern Roman Empire. However, according to Goffart, the love story may overall be happy, but it also involves a tumultuous relationship. Goffart writes the Goths and Romans union ‘is impeded by the absurd institution of Gothic kingship, by the resultant impostors, by bad Roman Emperors, and by Gothic lapses into atavistic behaviour; and is fostered by such kindly helpers as Constantine, Theodosius, Athanaric, Wallia, Justinian and Belisarius.’

That the Getica was intended to support Gothic integration into the Eastern Roman Empire is backed by several pieces of evidence. I will now mention some of them. Firstly, the Goths aided Emperor Maximian against the Parthians. Secondly, when the Goth Athanaric enters the city of Constantinople and sees the Imperial army, he exclaims ‘Truly the Emperor is a god on earth, and who raises a hand against him is guilty of his own blood’. However, the most important piece of evidence, as covered by Goffart, is the fact that Vitiges consort Mathesuentha, a Goth, and the Roman Patrician Germanus, Justinian’s cousin, are married and bear a child who is of mixed Gothic and Roman blood. Therefore, uniting the two races together.

Nevertheless, we must also raise the possibility that the love story between Goths and Romans might actually emerge from Cassiodorus in part. Cassiodorus in his Variae or letters, actively promotes an ideology of civilitas which aimed to unite Goths and Romans in Ostrogothic Italy. Therefore, has Goffart mistook the reason behind the love story in the Getica? The answer is not clear. We must not discount the possibility that Cassiodorus’ influence still finds its way in the text. But on the other hand, the fact that the story terminates with the union of Italy with the Eastern Roman Empire might suggest Goffart’s thesis is more true. My opinion on this matter is likely that the relationship between the Goths and Romans in the Getica is likely a mixture of Cassiodorus and Jordanes. The Getica, as I keep remphasising, is a complex text, it is original, but at the same time combines material from several authors. This results in a degree of ambiguity that needs unscrambling.

Now, we must also point out another nuance. Goffart argues that the Getica can only be understood along Jordanes’ other work, the Romana. This includes a universal Christian history, followed by a Roman history up to Justinian. Combined the works aim to place the Goths history with that of the Classical and Christian worlds. This placing of the Goths into the past is shown throughout the Getica. One example includes Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, making an alliance with the Goths and taking to wife Medopda, the daughter of the Gothic King Gudila. Goffart’s understanding about the Romana and Getica being placed together is therefore key. Again, the Getica must be seen as being caught in an intertextual web.

What I think?

You will likely now have an idea about my general ideas about the Getica’s historicity. However, to conclude, let me clarify it. Firstly, I believe we should approach the Getica as a literary text, despite Wolfram’s protestations. However, I do not want to completely dismiss the possibility of it containing genuine Gothic memories passed down from generation to generation. I just think we simply can’t prove them to be true. Even Jordanes had doubts about his sources for the Gothic migrations.

So is Goffart right? I have doubts about his ‘love story’, he needs to account, which he does, for the aspects of the Getica that contradict his theory. On the other hand, the evidence he cites for it is pretty strong and there are certainly aspects of the Getica that supports his thesis. But, I think, his biggest contribution is to treat the Getica as a literary text. Throughout this podcast, I have kept on mentioning the fact that the Getica is a complex source and I believe Goffart has this appreciation for the text.

So to finish off, the biggest thing I have took from my research on the Getica is its complexity. It is an amalgamation of several sources combined with original ideas. It therefore likely contains several discourses, which either help or contradict Jordanes. So let us be clear we must understand the Getica through its intertextuality, while also not concluding this prevents it from being original. The Getica therefore must be viewed as a literary work primarily.

That’s it, this is the end of my first podcast. I hope you have enjoyed it and found it informative. If you have any questions, please feel free to make a comment. Goodbye and see you soon.

Bibliography:

Goffart, Walter. “Jordanes’s “Getica” and the Disputed Authenticity of Gothic Origins from Scandinavia.” Speculum 80, no. 2 (2005): 379-98.

Goffart, Walter. The Narrators of Barbarian History (A.D 550-800: Jordanes, Gregory of Tours, Bede and Paul the Deacon. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Jordanes, Getica translated by Charles C. Mierow at https://people.ucalgary.ca/~vandersp/Courses/texts/jordgeti.html. Accessed 26/06/2020.

Liebeschuetz, J.H.W.G. “Making a Gothic History: Does the Getica of Jordanes Preserve Genuinely Gothic Traditions?” Journal of Late Antiquity 4, no. 2 (2011): 185-216.

Wolfram, Herwig. “Origo et Religio: Ethnic Traditions and Literature in Early Medieval Texts”. Early Medieval Europe, 3, no.1 (1994): 19-38.

Reading John Stuart Mill’s ‘Utilitarianism’

June 19, 2020 ~ Liam Greenacre ~ Leave a comment

While researching Epicurus, I came across John Stuart Mill’s ‘Utilitarianism’. An 1861 book it aims to introduce and discuss a theory of ethics that centres around achieving the maximal happiness for all individuals affected by an action. In this post, I shall discuss my experience of reading it and raise any points I found significant.

Mill starts by raising the divisive nature of ethical theories. The question of right and wrong, according to him, ‘has occupied the most gifted intellects and divided them into sects and schools carrying on a vigorous warfare against one another’. One cannot disagree with Mill on this, morality is a central question for humanity and so it is not surprising that it can be divisive. Another interesting point about ethics is that, unlike science, theory must precede practice. In my recent post, on Epicurus and Musonius Rufus, I argued philosophy should aim to be practical. However, ethics is an example that shows that theory is certainly not redundant. You cannot walk blindly into a scenario without an innate sense of right or wrong. Furthermore, if you do have a philosophical theory of ethics, it should certainly influence your actions.

So how should we make decisions according to Mill? According to him ‘actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.’ Like Epicurus, Mill believes that pleasure can be equated with happiness, whereas unhappiness is equated with pain. Utilitarianism is therefore a theory that holds actions should be undertook with a calculation of how much pleasure or happiness they shall produce for the maximum number of people affected. Mill states ‘pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends’. It is worth noting here, that Mill was definitely influenced by Epicurus, he mentions him several times, so understandably their ideas share some similarities.

However, when you state that pleasure is the ultimate aim of your philosophy you inevitably encounter a problem. Some think your idea of pleasure can be equated with base desires. And Mill certainly had this problem, he reveals that some think of utilitarianism as ‘a doctrine worthy only of swine’. Mill responds to this criticism by arguing ‘human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites’ and also writes ‘there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation’. Therefore, ‘base desires’ do not have much of a place in utilitarianism.

One aspect that sounds potentially dangerous initially is Mill’s separation between those of a higher intellect and a lower intellect. ‘Capacity for other nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant’, according to Mill. The lack of mental cultivation is according to him one of the main factors that prevents happiness in life. Thankfully, he attributes this absence to a person’s social position in life, rather than any innate factor. Mill states ‘the present wretched education and wretched social arrangements are the only real hindrance to its (happiness) being attainable by almost all.’

Another interesting aspect of Mill’s thought is his emphasis on the consequence of an action rather than the motive behind it. He writes ‘he who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his trouble’ and ‘the great majority of good actions are intended not for the benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up.’ Utilitarianism therefore emphasises actions can still be right, even if they are not done for the right reason. This, as Mill predicts, raises a potential criticism of the ethical theory. It suggests a bad person can carry out good actions and if they did utilitarianism would not critique them.

What other problems does utilitarianism face? Mill devotes an entire chapter to one- what is the motive to obey its ethical theory? Firstly, the improvement of education would have a pivotal role. It would do this by cultivating the inbuilt sense of unity human beings have. Mill states ‘if we now suppose this feeling of unity to be taught as a religion, and the whole forces of education, of institutions, and of opinion directed, as it once was in the case of religion, to make every person grow up from infancy surrounded on all sides by the profession and the practice of it, I think that no one who can realise this conception will feel any misgiving about the sufficiency of the ultimate sanction for the happiness morality.’ Another factor would also play a key role- the hope of favor and fear of displeasure from fellow humans or from God. Likewise, the fact that every being naturally desires his own happiness would have a role.

Mill also comments on the proof that is required for the utilitarian doctrine. His answer is simple; ‘no reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness.’ Utilitarianism is right because of the innate human desire for happiness and pleasure.

Another interesting aspect of Mill’s thought centres around virtue and the role it plays in utilitarianism. Virtue plays a central role in the ancient philosophy of Stoicism, so it was fascinating to find out that Mill still believes it to be important in his more Epicurean focused ideas. Virtue, according to Mill, is conductive to our pleasure and protects us from pain. As a result, it should be cultivated among the people to ensure general happiness. This crossover between Epicureanism and Stoicism in Mill resembles the interaction between the two philosophies in the ancient world. They were never in complete isolation from each other, even if sometimes they were opposed.

The final chapter of John Stuart Mill’s ‘Utilitarianism’ deals with the concept of justice. Mill raises that one of the main objections to theory that happiness is right or wrong comes from this topic. Should people not be punished or rewarded depending on their actions? Mill responds to this question by suggesting that justice should be guided by utility (whether it promotes happiness or not). He writes ‘I account the justice which is grounded on utility to be the chief part, and incomparably the most sacred and binding part, of morality.’ Therefore, justice with utilitarian principles would not be like the conception we have of it. Mill suggests to save a life, it may be allowable and a duty, to steal or take by force medicine or kidnap a medical practitioner. Utilitarian justice would therefore calculate if an action promoted happiness or not when making a decision on whether it should punished or not.

I have summarised Mill’s ‘Utilitarianism’, to conclude I will discuss my opinion on the work. I agree with the idea that one should carry out an action with a view to how much happiness it produces. However, I do not like how utilitarianism focuses on the consequences of an action rather than whether the action itself is right or wrong. The former could be dangerous- it could allow people to perform completely immoral acts just because they are seen to promote happiness. Nevertheless, I find the idea that education should focus on promoting happiness through utilitarianism quite an engaging idea. While it still should be taught alongside other ideas, teaching individuals the importance of attaining happiness and encouraging the unity of man could have the practical impact that education and philosophy should have. It is therefore fair to say then, that although I do not completely agree with Mill, I find most of the main concepts behind utilitarianism quite attractive.

Reading Musonius Rufus and Epicurus

June 15, 2020 ~ Liam Greenacre ~ 4 Comments

In a previous post, I mentioned that I thought Stoicism was a good system for approaching life. In this post, I will aim to describe why I have changed my mind to an extent. I will do this through a reading of the writings of Musonius Rufus, a Stoic, and Epicurus, the founder of Epicureanism. However, do not expect a complete shift, I still believe that Musonius Rufus has some wisdom to offer, even though I do not completely agree with his version of Stoicism.

I will start by discussing Musonius Rufus. Who was he? Rufus was a Roman eques (knight) who was born before 30 AD and died before 101/102. He was also a preeminent Stoic philosopher, even if he is less well known than his fellow Stoics; Seneca, Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus. Stoicism, in a simplified form, can be described as a philosophy that believes virtue is the main goal and good to strive towards and that it can be reached through self-control of our faculties. Rufus’ lectures and sayings are preserved in a fifth-century Anthology by Stobaeus. And these writings shall form part of my discussion in this post.

Before I criticise him, I want to make clear there are some very admirable traits of Musonius Rufus. Firstly, his belief that woman should also be educated and learn philosophy, as he puts it ‘women have received from the gods the same reasoning power as men.’. He also believes they can attain virtue like men, so long as they are not a ‘slave to desires’ and are ‘self-controlled’. Therefore, even though Rufus thinks woman should be allowed to study philosophy, he still demands the same tough standards he has for men. Another aspect of Rufus I like is his belief that philosophy should be practical rather than only theoretical. He argues this using a series of analogies. For example, arguing that you would rather see a doctor who can practice medicine, rather than only one who can talk about his expertise. This does not mean I believe that theory has no place in philosophy, but I believe it should be done with practicality in mind. If someone is studying the philosophy of history, then it should affect how they approach history in practice. Rufus also advocates vegetarianism, while I believe people should be free to choose what they eat, it does make me a tad more sympathetic towards him as I am vegetarian.

However, what I do not like about Rufus is his focus on pain. And this is where I found myself losing my fondness of Stoicism. Rufus writes ‘because we humans acquire all good things by pain, the person who is himself unwilling to endure pain all but condemns himself to being worthy of nothing good’. Statements like these put my commitment to Stoicism in doubt. When reading the other main Stoic philosophers, I do not remember this obsession with pain coming up much if at all, but nevertheless Rufus’ comments do put me off. However, the worst part about this, is that he advocates voluntary inflicting pain on oneself in order to train your ability to endure. He writes ‘we will train both soul and body when we accustom ourselves to cold, heat, thirst, hunger, scarcity of food, hardness of bed, abstaining from pleasures, and enduring pains.’ Seeking pain so you can endure more pain seems a disagreeable idea to me.

While I was reading Seneca, Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus, an aspect of their thought I liked was their dichotomy of control. This involves separating what you can control from what you cannot. Nearly, everything in Stoicism is out of your control, apart from your own mind and perceptions. However, I am no longer sure this is an effective dichotomy. What happens if there are certain instances in life where a person is no longer in complete control of their faculties due to no fault of their own? Stoicism might not be very useful in these circumstances. It is fair to say then I fallen out with Stoicism quite a lot then, although I believe no system is completely foolproof.

So what alternatives to Stoicism are there? Surprisingly, I have found myself drawn to Epicureanism, an ancient rival to Stoicism. Epicurus, who was born in 341 BC in the Athenian colony of Samos, argues that pleasure is the ultimate good. As he himself writes in his Letter to Menoeceus, ‘pleasure [is] the alpha and omega of a happy life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good.’ Epicureanism is therefore hedonistic with its focus on pleasure. This may evoke images of debauchery, but Epicureanism is far from that (and those who know me would probably laugh at the concept of me being hedonistic in the first sense, for example I do not drink). It seems Epicurus himself encountered misconceptions of his philosophy because he writes:

‘When we say pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or willful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of merrymaking, not sexual love, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning…’ Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus.

Epicureanism thus like Stoicism is focused on happiness, but it believes this is to be achieved through pleasure rather than virtue. This does not mean Epicureanism believes pain can be completely avoided in life. Rather it asks you to calculate and weigh up when making a decision whether the pleasure is worth the later pain, or whether a small pain will produce much greater pleasure in return. As Epicurus writes we ‘often pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensures from them. And often we consider pains to superior to pleasures when submission to the pains for a long time brings us a consequence a greater pleasure.’ Epicurus’ approach of maximising pleasure and minimising pain now seems a lot more attractive to me then Stoicism’s focus on enduring pain being necessary. Its ‘method of calculating’ pain and pleasure seems more positive and more proactive rather than simply enduring fate.

It is necessary to note here that Stoicism and Epicureanism are not completely opposed. In fact, Senenca often quotes from Epicurus. Epicureanism still believes we can control our desires of pleasure to minimise pain. For example, Epicurus writes ‘Don’t ruin the things you have by wanting what you don’t have, but realise that they too are things you once did wish for.’ Epicurus also warns ‘the esteem of others is outside our control; we must attend instead to healing ourselves.’ Therefore, if I am embracing Epicureanism more, it is not at the cost of all my Stoic learnings.

While I am newly interested in Epicureanism, that does not mean I agree with everything it says. Its physics is atomist (arguing the world is made of atoms) and as I do not have much of a background in the history of science, I cannot really comment on his theories. Furthermore, as I hinted at a previous post, I disagree with his approach to God (for him the classical Gods) as not being involved in the world. I believe that the very definition of God as omnipotent and omnibenevolent requires his intervention in the world. Therefore, I might agree more with the Stoics than Epicurus on divine matters.

To end, I want to quote Epicurus one more time. He writes ‘And to say that the season for studying philosophy has not yet come, or that it is past and gone, is like saying that the season for happiness it not yet or that is now no more’. Philosophy, as hopefully this post has shown, can have a direct influence on your wellbeing.