In this post, I shall explore Husserl’s views on the temporality of consciousness through a reading of ‘The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness.’ I have previously discussed Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, but the book for this post focuses specifically on the relationship between time and consciousness.

One theme that occurs throughout the book (though Husserl does not mention it much in this text) is a variety of the epoche or the suspension of belief about the world. Husserl writes ‘our aim is a phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness, involved in this, as in any other such analysis, is the complete exclusion of every assumption, stipulation, or conviction concerning Objective time (of all transcendent presuppositions concerning existents).’ In other words, Husserl is presenting a theory about how time operates in the consciousness and is not talking about time in objective reality.

Husserl uses an analogy about a piece of chalk to elaborate on this point. He suggests if we look at the chalk, then open and close our eyes and look at it again, we have had two perceptions. Phenomenologically speaking, there is a ‘temporal apartness’ between our perceptions, yet the chalk itself has objectively not changed. Husserl states ‘in the object there is duration, in the phenomenon, change.’ Our subjective experience is different to what is objectively occurring, at least in relation to time. This does not, in my opinion, exclude change from the ‘real’ world, but simply states that objects in the world have duration. They change, but not in a blink of an eye. In fact, Husserl hints at this when he argues that lived experiences in an objective sense are ‘temporally determined in an objective sense.’

Yet, we have to remember Husserl’s use of the concept of intentionality, that every stream of consciousness is always directed at an object. Thus, there is always an objective element to how we experience time. Husserl argues ‘we do not encounter temporal characters such as succession and duration merely in the primary content, but also in the Objects apprehended and in the act of apprehension. An analysis of time which is restricted to one level is not adequate, it must rather pursue the continuation of time at all levels.’ This seems initially to contradict with the epoche, but in my view it does not. Just because we suspend beliefs about the real world, does not mean we ignore it in our analysis, after all the objects we experience are ‘in-the world’ even if we experience them differently in the consciousness. The fact there can be multiple levels of time could also raise an issue how can one experience two levels at once. I would borrow from Basarab Nicolescu and his idea of the ‘hidden third’. This suggests paradoxes can exist due to the presence of multiple levels of reality and the ‘hidden third’ which connects all realities, in other words it is possible to experience one object differently at the same time, including temporally. The object is never fully present or absent. This also connects to Jacques Derrida’s idea of Différance, in which a word never fully summons its meaning due to its connections with other words and their interplay. In this way, words and indeed consciousness are always deferred, ‘they have a bit of other words and mental states’ respectively. With this in mind, it is possible to envisage the possibility of plural temporalities existing, perhaps emanating from consciousness and the ‘objective’ world and being experienced at the same time. Paradoxes and contradictions can exist.

Husserl has a very strong interest in the imagination. Methodologically speaking, this involves the technique of imaginary variation to identify the essential characteristics of objects. However, what role does fantasy play when it comes to the temporality of experience? For me, the key point is that it is related to retention (retaining a thought) and protention (the way in which you think the future will go). They are intrinsically related to each other. As Husserl writes ‘on the basis of the appearance of momentary recollections, phantasy forms ideas of the future in a process similar to that through which, circumstances permitting, we arrive at ideas of certain new varieties of colour and sound while keeping to known forms and relations.’ Our imagination is informed by the past and therefore affecting our predictions of the future. If we take the consideration that Husserl is an idealist (debatable, in my opinion, to the strength to which he is), it suggests that future realities are influenced by previous realities. In other words, the admittance that there are multiple realities (i.e Nicolescu or Anderson) does not imply that realities reconfigure overnight, rather change, though fundamental, may occur slowly and past realities will always inform future realities. Another thing to note is that if our realities are affected by our thoughts or imagination, this adds an ethical dimension to our discussion. It is imperative to understand this because it suggests we may be able to alter realities that exist, simply being affects metaphysics. It is therefore possible to enact actual metaphysical change for the better through the way we think.

If consciousness is temporal in its nature, an issue of mereology (concerning wholes and parts) is introduced. If we hear a melody, then how are the past, present and future parts of it linked in consciousness as a whole tune. Husserl states ‘they are in consciousness one after the other, but they fall within the same common act’ and that ‘the tones build up a successive unity with a common effect, the form of apprehension.’ How can they follow one another and yet still be part part of the same act? Husserl argues ‘the objectivity of the whole enduring tone is constituted in an act-continuum which in part is memory, in the smallest punctual part is perception, and in a more extensive part expectation.’ This suggests the tune is one act, because of the role retention and protention play in the present moment. This seems, in my view, to indicate Derrida’s reading of Husserl’s phenomenology is quite fruitful. Admittedly, Husserl uses the word ‘continuum’, but the fact that each individual moment is influenced by retention and protention, definitely suggests that consciousness is never fully in an instant. And, as mentioned, Derrida’s idea of Différance plays an important conceptual position in exemplifying this.

This post has discussed Husserl’s ‘The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness’, reading it, if one takes an idealist stance, raises some interesting ethical and metaphysical questions. How can we experience multiple temporalities at once? How can our thinking affect the world? And is consciousness ever present in a single moment? If not, then is any reality ever fully present or absent?

Bibliography:

Anderson, Greg. Realness of Things Past: Ancient Greece and Ontological History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press 1977.

Derrida, Jacques. Voice and Phenomenon: Introduction to the Problem of the Sign in Husserl’s Phenomenology translated by Leonard Lawlor. Evanston: North Western University Press, 2011.

Husserl, Edmund. Cartesian Meditations translated by Dorion Cairns. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999.

Husserl, Edmund. The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness translated by James S Churchill. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1964.

Nicolescu, Basarab. “Transdisciplinarity: past, present and future.” In Congresso Mundial de, pp. 1-24. 2006.

Nicolescu, Basarab. “Methodology of Transdisciplinarity,” World Futures, 70:3-4, 186-199 (2014)