This post shall explore Ian Bogost’s 2012 book ‘Alien Phenomenology- or What It’s Like to be a Thing.

Since I started my PhD, I have developed somewhat of an interest in non-human actors in the universe and I have marked out some reading to examine this topic in more depth. My first taste of this idea (that objects have agency) came through a History undergraduate module called Debating History . I remember reading a chapter of Latour’s (2007) Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory for a seminar. My first response was quite negative- I did not necessarily agree with Actor Network Theory (ANT), probably because my postmodernism, at the time, led me down a constructionist rather than a materialist stance. Yet, over time, the theory grew on me. I have a favourite cup which I received as a Birthday or Christmas present and I nearly dropped it once, only at the last moment did I grasp it. I felt a sense of fear then relief. It was then I realised objects can convey emotions, in fact, they can act on humans. Now here’s the question of Alien Phenomenology – it is one thing to say that objects are of ontological worth, but it is another thing completely to describe their experience. What is it like to be a rock? I admire deeply Bogost’s attempt to do this in his book, it is very brave. And in this post, I shall examine what I believe are his strongest points in relation to this topic. However, first, there are some points to be made.

Firstly, I am not quite sure whether phenomenology is the quite the right word to describe Bogost’s method. When I say this, I refer to my knowledge of phenomenology in philosophy (and not phenomenology the method). Bogost is aiming to elucidate subjective experience, but then again as an Object-Orientated Ontology- it is quite materialistic and Husserlian phenomenology splits the world into the essential features in consciousness and the non-essential parts (Husserl, 2013). Meanwhile, Heidegger (2010) introduces the concept of Being-in-the-World which takes the concept of intentionality (that consciousness is always of something) and suggests the individual or to use his term Dasein is already immersed in a world of objects. For me, both these variations of phenomenology do not fit with Bogost’s suggestion that an object is an object independent of any human (even if he does suggest we relate to objects). Anyway, you could argue this problem of definition is just semantics- and I would be tempted to agree- but I just wanted to clarify this matter a bit.

The second thing I want to mention, before discussing his methodologies for finding out what it’s like to be an object, is his tiny ontology, which I find an attractive idea. It suggests multiple ontological units can exist within the same space, in other words they are superimposed on each other despite being different sizes. This is not as controversial as it may initially appear. In Quantum Mechanics, the study of the smallest constituents of the universe, particles are represented by a wave function which indicates all probabilities in relation to its particles, these probabilities are superpositioned-they all exist at the same time. Now theoretically and empirically, there is growing range of evidence to suggest that superposition may also be possible in the Classical World of Physics, Friedman and Patel et al. (2000) have suggested a quantum interference device can placed in superposition. Yin and Li (2017) suggest superposition might even be realisable in microbes- due to the fact that many quantum phenomena are in fact larger than microbes. In other words, Bogost’s ontology is not as far-fetched as it may seem.

Now what is it like to be an object? One suggestion is to use ontographs as a tool. Essentially, these are lists or descriptions of objects. Bogost suggests they help us identify the individuality of objects because they are a form of classification. Yet, they also tell us about how objects act. For example, citing the video-game Scribblenauts, Bogost describes how we can find out how object’s relations through this game- how they can work together to achieve specific aims. The aim of the game is to solve puzzles by summoning objects, through which we learn how they act and how they relate. In this way, writing a litany of Scribblenauts actions could be a form of ontography- as it highlights objects nature of being.

Metaphorism is suggested as another technique to understand objects’ experience. This could come in the form of a bat’s sensing being like the sonar of a submarine. We can also identify objects experiences through a ‘daisy chain’ of relations (how they link, especially metaphorically). In this instance, I would find metaphorism more problematic than helpful. We are just comparing it to another object- not human experience. On the other hand, perhaps, we could try to imagine what it is like to be an object creatively (which Bogost does through ontographs and carpentry). I therefore find his other methods of understanding an object’s experience more fruitful.

Carpentry is the process of designing to understand objects. Bogost, as a video game designer, uses the example of Ben Fry’s Deconstructulator which shows sprites and sprite memory while the game is being made. In other words, you could see the technical processes that create Super Mario Bros while playing it. You could, essentially, see what it is like to be a Nintendo Entertainment System and a video game through an interface such as this. Bogost frequently uses video game examples like this in his exposition during the book, yet he also suggests other possibilities, such as (p109):

An electron strikes phosphor, lighting a speck on a fluorescent tube that glows and fades,

A metal catch closes a circuit on silicon, whose state a processor bitwise compares to a charge on another wafer.

In this way it is possible, to gain an understanding of an object through a way of revealing its output. Yet, one wonders, how could you understand an animal through carpentry? Is designing objects to reveal what it is like to be an animal (if possible) ethical if it affects the animal? My point here is Bogost uses a wide variety of technological examples, but would these work for understanding animals, plants, fungi, rocks and other non-technological objects? For me, the answer is not clear.

Bogost is a brave thinker and that is a good thing. I like his ontography and carpentry, but I am less sure about his metaphorism. Overall, then, I feel his work is a step in the right direction for understanding other objects, but I am not sure that it completes this mission fully (though it does get close). Nevertheless, it has sparked a few ideas in my mind and I will be keen to relate it to my PhD and read more on this issue.

Bibliography:

Bogost, Ian. Alien phenomenology, or, what it’s like to be a thing. U of Minnesota Press, 2012.

Friedman, Jonathan R., Vijay Patel, Wei Chen, S. K. Tolpygo, and James E. Lukens. “Quantum superposition of distinct macroscopic states.” Nature 406, no. 6791 (2000): 43-46.

Heidegger, Martin. Being and time. Suny Press, 2010.

Husserl, Edmund. Cartesian meditations: An introduction to phenomenology. Springer Science & Business Media, 2013.

Latour, Bruno. Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory. OUP, 2007.

Yin, Zhang-qi, and Tongcang Li. “Bringing quantum mechanics to life: from Schrödinger’s cat to Schrödinger’s microbe.” Contemporary Physics 58, no. 2 (2017): 119-139.