Tag: Ontology

Review: Alien Phenomenology- or What It’s Like to Be a Thing by Ian Bogost

~ Liam Greenacre ~ Leave a comment

This post shall explore Ian Bogost’s 2012 book ‘Alien Phenomenology- or What It’s Like to be a Thing.

Since I started my PhD, I have developed somewhat of an interest in non-human actors in the universe and I have marked out some reading to examine this topic in more depth. My first taste of this idea (that objects have agency) came through a History undergraduate module called Debating History . I remember reading a chapter of Latour’s (2007) Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory for a seminar. My first response was quite negative- I did not necessarily agree with Actor Network Theory (ANT), probably because my postmodernism, at the time, led me down a constructionist rather than a materialist stance. Yet, over time, the theory grew on me. I have a favourite cup which I received as a Birthday or Christmas present and I nearly dropped it once, only at the last moment did I grasp it. I felt a sense of fear then relief. It was then I realised objects can convey emotions, in fact, they can act on humans. Now here’s the question of Alien Phenomenology – it is one thing to say that objects are of ontological worth, but it is another thing completely to describe their experience. What is it like to be a rock? I admire deeply Bogost’s attempt to do this in his book, it is very brave. And in this post, I shall examine what I believe are his strongest points in relation to this topic. However, first, there are some points to be made.

Firstly, I am not quite sure whether phenomenology is the quite the right word to describe Bogost’s method. When I say this, I refer to my knowledge of phenomenology in philosophy (and not phenomenology the method). Bogost is aiming to elucidate subjective experience, but then again as an Object-Orientated Ontology- it is quite materialistic and Husserlian phenomenology splits the world into the essential features in consciousness and the non-essential parts (Husserl, 2013). Meanwhile, Heidegger (2010) introduces the concept of Being-in-the-World which takes the concept of intentionality (that consciousness is always of something) and suggests the individual or to use his term Dasein is already immersed in a world of objects. For me, both these variations of phenomenology do not fit with Bogost’s suggestion that an object is an object independent of any human (even if he does suggest we relate to objects). Anyway, you could argue this problem of definition is just semantics- and I would be tempted to agree- but I just wanted to clarify this matter a bit.

The second thing I want to mention, before discussing his methodologies for finding out what it’s like to be an object, is his tiny ontology, which I find an attractive idea. It suggests multiple ontological units can exist within the same space, in other words they are superimposed on each other despite being different sizes. This is not as controversial as it may initially appear. In Quantum Mechanics, the study of the smallest constituents of the universe, particles are represented by a wave function which indicates all probabilities in relation to its particles, these probabilities are superpositioned-they all exist at the same time. Now theoretically and empirically, there is growing range of evidence to suggest that superposition may also be possible in the Classical World of Physics, Friedman and Patel et al. (2000) have suggested a quantum interference device can placed in superposition. Yin and Li (2017) suggest superposition might even be realisable in microbes- due to the fact that many quantum phenomena are in fact larger than microbes. In other words, Bogost’s ontology is not as far-fetched as it may seem.

Now what is it like to be an object? One suggestion is to use ontographs as a tool. Essentially, these are lists or descriptions of objects. Bogost suggests they help us identify the individuality of objects because they are a form of classification. Yet, they also tell us about how objects act. For example, citing the video-game Scribblenauts, Bogost describes how we can find out how object’s relations through this game- how they can work together to achieve specific aims. The aim of the game is to solve puzzles by summoning objects, through which we learn how they act and how they relate. In this way, writing a litany of Scribblenauts actions could be a form of ontography- as it highlights objects nature of being.

Metaphorism is suggested as another technique to understand objects’ experience. This could come in the form of a bat’s sensing being like the sonar of a submarine. We can also identify objects experiences through a ‘daisy chain’ of relations (how they link, especially metaphorically). In this instance, I would find metaphorism more problematic than helpful. We are just comparing it to another object- not human experience. On the other hand, perhaps, we could try to imagine what it is like to be an object creatively (which Bogost does through ontographs and carpentry). I therefore find his other methods of understanding an object’s experience more fruitful.

Carpentry is the process of designing to understand objects. Bogost, as a video game designer, uses the example of Ben Fry’s Deconstructulator which shows sprites and sprite memory while the game is being made. In other words, you could see the technical processes that create Super Mario Bros while playing it. You could, essentially, see what it is like to be a Nintendo Entertainment System and a video game through an interface such as this. Bogost frequently uses video game examples like this in his exposition during the book, yet he also suggests other possibilities, such as (p109):

An electron strikes phosphor, lighting a speck on a fluorescent tube that glows and fades,

A metal catch closes a circuit on silicon, whose state a processor bitwise compares to a charge on another wafer.

In this way it is possible, to gain an understanding of an object through a way of revealing its output. Yet, one wonders, how could you understand an animal through carpentry? Is designing objects to reveal what it is like to be an animal (if possible) ethical if it affects the animal? My point here is Bogost uses a wide variety of technological examples, but would these work for understanding animals, plants, fungi, rocks and other non-technological objects? For me, the answer is not clear.

Bogost is a brave thinker and that is a good thing. I like his ontography and carpentry, but I am less sure about his metaphorism. Overall, then, I feel his work is a step in the right direction for understanding other objects, but I am not sure that it completes this mission fully (though it does get close). Nevertheless, it has sparked a few ideas in my mind and I will be keen to relate it to my PhD and read more on this issue.

Bibliography:

Bogost, Ian. Alien phenomenology, or, what it’s like to be a thing. U of Minnesota Press, 2012.

Friedman, Jonathan R., Vijay Patel, Wei Chen, S. K. Tolpygo, and James E. Lukens. “Quantum superposition of distinct macroscopic states.” Nature 406, no. 6791 (2000): 43-46.

Heidegger, Martin. Being and time. Suny Press, 2010.

Husserl, Edmund. Cartesian meditations: An introduction to phenomenology. Springer Science & Business Media, 2013.

Latour, Bruno. Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory. OUP, 2007.

Yin, Zhang-qi, and Tongcang Li. “Bringing quantum mechanics to life: from Schrödinger’s cat to Schrödinger’s microbe.” Contemporary Physics 58, no. 2 (2017): 119-139.

Review: The Realness of Things Past, Ancient Greece and Ontological History

~ Liam Greenacre ~ Leave a comment

In this post, I shall review Greg Anderson’s ambitious 2018 book ‘The Realness of Things Past: Ancient Greece and Ontological History‘.

Anderson, in the reviewed book, ‘proposes a fundamental change in the rules of historical engagement, a paradigm shift that would be roughly equivalent to the quantum revolution in modern physics.’ He argues that we should view each past way of life on its own ontological terms and abandon the categories we apply to them. The Ancient Athenians had no knowledge of ‘religion’, ‘state’ or ‘economy’, these are purely inventions of our own peculiar modern way of being. Meanwhile, we should view the Greek gods as having agency- yes, according to Anderson, they existed because the Athenian world had different rules to ours. Furthermore, the region of Attica was a living organism composed of different components that functioned together, it was not a ‘state’. To argue for this radical acceptance of ontological alterity, Anderson covers a wide range of subjects and disciplines including quantum mechanics, anthropology, postcolonialism and posthumanism.

He begins his account by outlining the traditional view of Classical Athens. Concepts like ‘democracy’ are criticised. Anderson exposes a number of contradictions, if we were to see Athens as such a thing. Firstly, how do we explain Athens imperialistic domination of 170 Greek poleis around the Aegean basin? Secondly, modern accounts are confused by how ‘democratic’ Athenians could hold superstitious beliefs. To many today, it would seem odd that they could be democratic and still hold such beliefs. However, Anderson is keen to point out that such a contradiction only emerges when we place our own expectations on Athens.

Anderson, however, in presenting his account of the fallacies of our way of historical thinking, portrays modernity in a homogenous fashion. For example, many believe in God and democracy, there is no contradiction there. Furthermore, there are many non-democratic countries in the modern world. It would be wrong to presume that everyone would apply the same categories to Classical Athens.

Nevertheless, Anderson’s point that there are alternate ways of being historically is well evidenced throughout the book. For example, the pre-colonial Hawai’ians were not individuals, instead they all participated in the being of the king. Furthermore, the description of Late Medieval society as a ‘body’ again shows there are different ways of existing than the modern Western individual.

A methodological issue that Anderson should have addressed is pertinent here. He takes a literal approach to the sources- in other words he accepts what they say without question. If the Athenians thought there were Gods then they must exist, if Attica is described as a body then it must have been a living organism. Critics could suggest that an ontological approach simply mistakes literary topoi for reality. Just because a writer said something, does not mean he intended it to be took literally. On the other hand, Anderson certainly provides a robust account of the ontological grounds for accepting the alterity of past ‘worlds.’ Quantum mechanics, for example, displaces the idea of an observation independent reality. Meanwhile, posthumanism questions the divide between nature and culture, genetics and nurture, environment and self. There are therefore grounds for believing there could have been alternate ‘worlds’ unlike our own. Of course, on a related note, perhaps due to quantum mechanics and posthumanism, Anderson could have reduced the emphasis on the domination of his notion of Western/Cartesian thinking. His idea of modernity does not stand scrutiny, when considered alongside the theories he mentions.

The final section of the book is focused on portraying what the alternative Athens would have looked life. One suggestion is that individuals were oikoi– family or household units. Athenian oikoi were part of the larger organism that they all comprised of. Individuals, in a sense, were dividuals, they were all components of a wider lifeform. There were also Gods and so rituals formed the main means through which this organism was sustained. Potentially, rituals were even more important than any economic, social or legal actions when it came to maintenance. Households also formed wider groups of being, which in themselves formed Demos, the unitary body. Overall, then Anderson’s portrayal of Classical Athens is quite unlike our ‘democratic’ and ‘individualistic’ conception of it.

Anderson’s book is radical and is somewhat attractive due to the way it appreciates past experiences and does not convert them into modern renditions. However, as highlighted, there are some issues that are addressed if ontological history is to gain wider acceptance. Nevertheless, Anderson remains thought-provoking throughout.

Isidore Mini-Project #1: What is the Ontological Turn?

~ Liam Greenacre ~ Leave a comment

This post starts a series where I will be exploring if the Ontological Turn, originating from anthropology, can aid our understanding of the Late Antique past. I will do this by examining some of Isidore of Seville’s texts to see if we can recover his ‘world’ or ontology. However, before this, I will introduce the Ontological Turn in this post and discuss its implications for the historical discipline.

The anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros De Castro describes one of the distinct features of some Amerindian societies. He states that within them they see animals as humans, in terms of their souls. Whereas, their body or ‘skin’ is mere clothing. This is different to the European point of view, where humans are elevated above animals due to their ‘superior’ souls and instead the body is seen as the unifying factor between species (e.g. through DNA). This suggests that Amerindian societies often had and have a distinct way of viewing the world that is radically different to Eurocentric understandings. This raises the question about how are to study Amerindian societies when they seem so at odds with post-Enlightment European views, raising questions regarding the tools and categories used in anthropological studies and other disciplines. The Ontological Turn engages with this problem and proposes a new way to study radical difference.

It does this by suggesting we should take the worlds of other societies seriously. Reality, according to the Ontological Turn, is not composed of a single world, instead it is composed of multiple worlds. It therefore opposes the idea of culture being imposed on a single reality and denies the existence of a common human nature. Another key aspect of the Ontological Turn is its focus on nonhuman actors. It goes beyond Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and Object-oriented Ontology (OOO), by focusing on animals, spirits and other non-human actors, alongside objects. To use an example that might this series’ medieval focus, if one world says God or dead saints have a role in society and agency, then one has to take that claim seriously. They really exist and exert an influence on a reality. This may seem at odds with the views of modernity, but to fully understand different worlds we need an openess to non-Eurocentric and pre-Englightment realities.

One advantage of the Ontological Turn is therefore its acceptance of alterity. However, another aspect that needs consideration is that it offers a return to empirical and positvist inclinations. It takes statements at face value, rather than analysing cultural discourses that overlay the ‘real’ world . In it one describes the world as they find it, rather than seeking to apply one’s assumptions to it. However, there are also potential criticisms of the Ontological Turn. One raised by Vigh and Sausdal regards translation. if one denies the existence of a united human nature then how does one establish a ‘common ground’ to understand and interpret other worlds? Methodologically speaking, you might reach a dead end. A futher criticism raised by Vigh and Sausdal is that radical alterity and exotification are some of the primary ways anthropology has been misused outside the academy. Painting other worlds as inherently different might easily result in abuse in a political context.

While the Ontological Turn emerged from from anthropology, talk of other worlds can also be found in other disciplines. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions claims that scientists working in other paradigms might be said to live in different worlds. Whereas, Swenson has engaged with the Ontological Turn in her work on Peruvian archaeology, despite the fact that she refutes it. In the historical discipline, Greg Anderson has been the most vocal proponent of the Ontological Turn, in particular by analysing ancient Athens. He claims there are three key aspects of the Athenian ‘world’ that separate it from ours. Firstly, that the Gods were living and that they were ‘real independent subjects and agents in the world of time and space’. Secondly, that Attica (Athens’ land) was a living organism, it was not just a generic territorial tract. Finally, that individuals in Athens formed part of a corporate body constitued of households, they saw themsleves as united together. Anderson argues, that only the Ontological Turn can prevent us from colonising the past and imposing the trappings of modernity on it. We must avoid applying our own historical categories and see the past as it was. This ends a summary of the Ontological Turn.

This post has addressed the question; what is the Ontological Turn? In the next post in this series, I will examine Isidore of Seville’s Etymologies in order to retrieve his ‘world’. The Etymologies are a good source when applying the Ontological Turn to the Late Antique past due to their encylopedic nature. During the next post, I will also consider the critical issues that might arise when trying to understand a past world through historical sources. Nevertheless, after this post, it should now be clear what the Ontological Turn is.

Bibliography:

Anderson, Greg. ‘Retrieving the Lost Worlds of the Past: The Case for an Ontological Turn.’ The American Historical Review 120, 3 (2015), 787-810.

Castro, Eduardo Viveiros de. ‘Cosmological Deixis and Amerindian Perspectivism.’ The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 4, 3 (1998), 469-488.

Pickering, Andrew.’The Ontological Turn: Taking Different Worlds Seriosuly.’ Social Analysis 61, 2 (2017), 134-150.

Sausdal, David and Henrik Vigh. ‘From Essence Back to Existence: Anthropology Beyond the Ontological Turn.’ Anthropological Theory 14, 1 (2014), 49-73.

Swenson, Edward. ‘The Materialities of Place Making in the Ancient Andes: a Critical Appraisal of the Ontological Turn in Archaeological Interpretation.’ Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory 22 (2015), 677-712.